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Abstract. Demand for intelligent surveillance in public transport systems is grow-
ing due to the increased threats of terrorist attack, vandalism and litigation. The
aim of intelligent surveillance is in-time reaction to information received from
various monitoring devices, especially CCTV systems. However, video analytic
algorithms can only provide static assertions, whilst in reality, many related events
happen in sequence and hence should be modeled sequentially. Moreover, an-
alytic algorithms are error-prone, hence how to correct the sequential analytic
results based on new evidence (external information or later sensing discovery)
becomes an interesting issue. In this paper, we introduce a high-level sequential
observation modeling framework which can support revision and update on new
evidence. This framework adapts the situation calculus to deal with uncertainty
from analytic results. The output of the framework can serve as a foundation for
event composition. We demonstrate the significance and usefulness of our frame-
work with a case study of a bus surveillance project.
Keywords: Intelligent Surveillance; Active System; Situation Calculus; Belief Change;
Sequential Observation.
1 Introduction
Recently, more and more attention has been paid by governments and transport op-
erators to protect vehicles and passengers with surveillance cameras, e.g., the Florida
School Bus Surveillance project [2], the First Glasgow Bus Surveillance [22], Federal
Intelligent Transportation System Program in the US [18], Washington rail corridor
surveillance [17], Airport Corridor Surveillance in the UK [16], etc. These applica-
tions require deployment of large-scale CCTV systems giving rise to unique problems.
For example, in a reasonable sized provincial city there may be several hundred buses,
each of which has 12-14 cameras, giving a total of several thousand cameras. The large
amount of cameras for monitoring passengers/vehicles makes it almost impossible to
detect possible incidents manually without delay. For this reason, video analytics and
event reasoning are being introduced to CCTV systems in order to ensure in-time reac-
tion.
The aim of video analytics is single-event recognition. Recently, however, develop-
ers have realized that it is necessary to manage the events generated by video analysis
software. For instance, to prevent anti-social behaviors on public transport systems, one
has to make a decision based on a sequence of detected events. Ideally, this would be
straightforward if the recognized events are correct and certain. Unfortunately, in real-
ity, imperfection and mistakes frequently occur in practical applications. For example,
in the case of a person entering the bus doorway, the person may be classified as male
with a certainty of 85% by the classification analytics, rather than with 100% certainty.
Even worse, the analytic algorithm may classify a person as female at one time instant
and male at a later time. In addition to inaccurate analytics, a large amount of mistakes
are caused by the unreliability of the data sources. For example, in the classification
example above, the camera may have been tampered with, illumination could be poor,
or the classifier training set may be unrepresentative. Any, or all of these, can result in
imperfection and errors.
In this paper, we introduce a sequential observation modeling framework which is
able to deal with uncertainty, and can support revision and update when new evidence is
received, thereby removing the influence of past errors. This framework, which operates
at a higher level than analytic algorithms, deploys a situation calculus foundation with
the ability to deal with uncertainty in analytic results. It is also able to handle belief
revision and update properly. We demonstrate the significance and usefulness of our
framework with a case study of a bus surveillance project [12, 7, 10, 15]. Our approach
provides a sound framework for surveillance applications, such as CCTV for buses,
airports, etc. The output of the framework, i.e., primitive events, can be used as a starting
point of event composition.
Usually in situation calculus, there are sensing and non-sensing actions, or epis-
temic and ontic actions [4]. A sensing/epistemic action senses a property of the domain
and does not change the environment. A non-sensing/ontic action is an action done by
the agent which changes the environment. A major difference between real-world sit-
uations, such as those encountered in surveillance applications, and situation calculus
approaches is that in the former, even the result of an ontic action, e.g., a passenger
changes their position from standing to seated, is observed by cameras and analyzed by
video analytic algorithms (and hence sometimes we call the agent of interest an observ-
able). Therefore, situation calculus should be significantly adapted to make it suitable
for intelligent surveillance purposes.
In intelligent surveillance applications the results of both epistemic and ontic ac-
tions are provided by video analytics, therefore, we must differentiate between both
kinds of actions, since they respond differently upon new evidence being obtained. The
properties sensed by epistemic actions are generally invariable, e.g., the gender of a
person, etc., whilst properties related to ontic actions are those that can be changed at
will, e.g., the position of a person, etc. We also allow external information to be handled
in this framework. External information, when received and used, can be seen as a kind
of epistemic or ontic action, according to the information properties. For instance, if
a piece of information tells us a person is a male, then it can be seen as an epistemic
action; if it tells us a person is standing, it can be seen as an ontic action. In addition,
a property related to an epistemic action will be called an epistemic or an invariable
property, and similarly, a property related to an ontic action is called an ontic or a vari-
able property. In summary, if a property indicates an intrinsic character of an observable
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of interest, and hence is invariable, then it is an epistemic property. But we also need
to point out that this property could be mis-classified or even intentionally disguised,
which seemingly makes it variable. For example, although a person is a male, he could
be wrongly classified as a female. He could even disguise himself as a female if he
wants to. However, this superficial variability should not cause any confusion. Instead,
ontic properties are usually external properties between an observable of interest and
the environment, and hence are variable, e.g., a passenger can move from the drivers
cabin area to the saloon area on a bus. This differentiation between epistemic and on-
tic properties also applies to properties obtained by video analytics. For instance, if
the gender of a person is in fact estimated from the captured video, it is still called an
epistemic property since gender is an intrinsic character of a person.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the preliminaries
on the situation calculus. In Section 3, formal approaches to deal with uncertain ob-
servations are presented, including the ways in which to handle epistemic and ontic
actions. Section 4 shows how belief revision is adequately handled in our framework.
We then provide a case study, which is a simplified bus surveillance scenario, in Section
5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Situation calculus, introduced by John McCarthy [13, 14], has been applied widely to
model and reason about actions and changes in dynamic systems. It was reinterpreted
in [19] as basic action theories which are comprised of a set of foundational axioms
defining the space of situations, unique-name axioms for actions, action preconditions
and effects axioms, and the initial situation axioms [5]. The well known frame problem
is solved by a set of special action effects axioms called successor state axioms.
Since actions carried out by agents cause constant changes of the agents’ beliefs,
developing strategies of managing belief changes triggered by actions is an important
issue. The problem of iterated belief change within the framework of situation calculus
has been investigated widely, e.g., [20, 21, 24, 11]. In [24], a new framework extending
previous approaches was proposed, in which a plausibility value is attached to every
situation. This way, the framework is able to deal with nested beliefs, belief introspec-
tion, mistaken beliefs, and it can also handle belief revision and update together in a
seamless way. The framework in [24] is based on an extension of action theory [19]
stemming from situation calculus [13, 14]. Here we introduce the notion of situation
calculus from [24] which includes a belief operator [20, 21].
According to [24], the situation calculus is a predicate calculus language for repre-
senting dynamically changing domains. A situation represents a snapshot of the domain.
There is a set of initial situations corresponding to what the agents believe the domain
might be initially. The actual initial state of the domain is represented by a distinguished
initial situation constant, S0, which may or may not be among the set of initial situa-
tions believed by an agent. The term do(a, s) denotes the unique situation that results
from the agent performing action a in situation s.
Predicates and functions whose values may change from situation to situation (and
whose last argument is a situation) are called fluents. For instance, we use the fluent
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InR1(s) to represent that the agent is in room R1 in situation s. The effects of actions
on fluents are defined using successor state axioms [19], which provide a succinct rep-
resentation for both effect axioms and frame axioms [13, 14]. For instance, if there are
two rooms (R1, R2) and an action Leave takes the agent from the current room to the
other room. Then, the successor state axiom for InR1 is [24]:
InR1
(
do(a, s)
) ≡ ((¬InR1(s) ∧ a = Leave) ∨ (InR1(s) ∧ a 6= Leave)).
This axiom says that the agent will be in Room 1 after doing action a in s iff either
it is in Room 2 and leaves for Room 1 or is currently in Room 1 and does not leave.
Levesque [6] introduced a predicate, SF(a, s), to describe the result of performing
the binary-valued epistemic action a. SF(a, s) holds (returns true) iff the sensor asso-
ciated with a returns the sensing value 1 in situation s. Each epistemic action senses
some property of the domain. The property sensed by an action is associated with the
action using a guarded sensed fluent axiom [3]. For example, the following two axioms
InR1(s)→ (SF(SenseLight, s) ≡ Light1(s))
¬InR1(s)→ (SF(SenseLight, s) ≡ Light2(s))
can be used to specify that SenseLight senses whether the light is on in the room the
agent is currently located.
In this paper, we adopt the following conventions about guarded action theories
Σ consisting of: (A) successor state axioms for each fluent, and guarded sensed fluent
axioms for each action; (B) unique names axioms for actions, and domain-independent
foundational axioms; and (C) initial state axioms which describe the initial state of the
domain and the initial beliefs of agents. A domain-dependent fluent means a fluent other
than the probability fluent p, and a domain-dependent formula is one that only mentions
domain-dependent fluents. However, since this is a paper focusing on applications, we
will not introduce the axioms here. Interested readers can refer to [24, 11]. We further
assume that there is only one agent acting in a chosen domain, although the framework
is capable of accommodating multiple agents.
3 The Revised Situation Calculus Framework
In this section, we extend the situation calculus to include a probability operator to
account for iterated belief changes and deal with uncertainty.
Usually in situation calculus, the result of all actions are accurate. In recent work,
e.g., [1, 23, 24, 11], noisy epistemic actions have been proposed and studied. However,
in intelligent surveillance applications, not only can epistemic actions be noisy, but ontic
actions can also be subject to noise (recall an epistemic action senses some property of
the domain, but leaves the environment unchanged, while an ontic action changes the
actual environment). That is, in these applications, the results of ontic actions are also
reported by video analytic algorithms, which may (and in fact usually, if not always)
present uncertain results. For example, if a passenger takes a seat, then from a normal
situation calculus point of view, its status certainly changes from “standing” to “seated”.
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However, if the scenario is analyzed by an algorithm, due to the imperfection of the
algorithm, it can only give 90% degree of certainty that the passenger is seated, leaving
the remaining 10% still standing. That is, ontic actions can also bring uncertainty, or
noise. In fact, in a few scenarios (e.g., light changes suddenly outside the window),
the analytic results could be very inaccurate. It may conclude that with 60% degree of
certainty the passenger is seated and 40% degree of certainty the passenger is standing.
These cases cannot be handled in classical situation calculus. Hence, we need to adapt
the situation calculus to deal with such cases.
For convenience, we denote SA the set of all epistemic actions and hence for each
action a, a ∈ SA means that a is an epistemic action while a 6∈ SA means that a is a
ontic action. Since an ontic action a can bring up more than one possible result (e.g.,
“seated” or ”standing”), the corresponding do(a, s) may also give rise to more than one
successive situation. An epistemic action a can also bring up more than one possible
result if it is not accurate.
Example 1 Let a situation s = M ∧ S (the passenger is male and standing), then
a noisy (inaccurate) epistemic action presents a result as the passenger is male with
probability 0.4 and female with probability 0.6, then two successive situations s1 =
M ∧ S with probability value 0.4 and s2 = ¬M ∧ S with probability 0.6 should be
expected.
Hence, subsequently in this paper, we assume do(a, s) is a set of situations instead
of a single situation. Moreover, in this paper, we assume SF(a, s) (different from the
definition in [6] where SF(a, s) returns a boolean value) gives the tuple-valued sensing
result (x1, · · · , xk) where each xi stands for the probability that the epistemic action
returns result Xi. For instance, in the above example, SF(a, s) = (0.4, 0.6) means that
the passenger is male with probability 0.4 and female with probability 0.6 when a is
an epistemic action returning the gender of the passenger. For convenience, we also
write SF(X, a, s) to denote the probability that the epistemic action a returns X , e.g.,
SF(M,a, s) = 0.4,SF(¬M,a, s) = 0.6. Similarly, we write NSF(a, s) (NS is short for
Non-Sensing) to present the tuple-valued ontic action result (x1, · · · , xt) where each xi
stands for the probability that the ontic action returns result Xi. For instance, if a is an
ontic action changing the behavior of a passenger, then NSF(a, s) = (0.2, 0.8) means
that there is a probability 0.2 such that a passenger is standing and a probability 0.8
such that it is seated (¬S). Similarly, we also denote NSF(X, a, s) the probability that
the ontic action a returns X .
In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that all actions, regardless of whether they
are epistemic or ontic, can only provide two possible results. In fact, if they could return
more than two possible results, no essential changes are needed for the framework, but
a more cumbersome description of the scenarios, e.g., SF(a, s) will be a n-tuple value
where n > 2 and the number of successive situations will become greater, etc..
In this paper, we use ordinals as time points to indicate the sequence of situations.
More precisely, all the initial situations will have a subscript 0, denoted as si0 (where
i indicates the i-th possible situation), and the successive situation of a situation sn
will be sn+1. Let Sn denote the set of all situations with subscript n, i.e., the set of
situations in the n-th run. Note that if s and s′ are both in Sn, then we should have
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SF(a, s) = SF(a, s′) (resp. NSF(a, s) = NSF(a, s′)) since the action is taken in the
real world, it should return only one result, no matter what we think the real-world
situation might be (e.g., s or s′). From this sense, we can write SFn(a) or NSFn(a)
to denote the action result for situations in the n-th run. Furthermore, we use s/X to
denote a situation that the property corresponding to X in s is changed to X , e.g., for
s =M ∧ S, we have s/M = s and s/¬M = ¬M ∧ S.
The belief set of Sn is defined as follows. Let φ[s] denote that φ is assessed in s.
For example M (the passenger is a male) is assessed in s =M ∧ S, hence M [s] holds.
Let pn(φ) =
∑
s:s∈Sn∧φ[s] p(s) indicate the total probability of φ in Sn.
Definition 1 Beln(φ)
def
= pn(φ) > pn(¬φ).
That is, φ is believed in the n-th run if it is more probable than its negation. Since
this definition is not closed under deduction, i.e., Beln(φ) ∧ Beln(ψ) 9 Beln(φ ∧
ψ), we usually only consider probabilities (and hence beliefs) on atoms (e.g., Male,
Stand, etc.), while probabilities (and hence beliefs) of other formulae are computed
from probabilities of atoms (with independence assumptions) [9].
Based on the above notations and definitions, we can define a probability function
p for each situation s to measure how possible an agent considers s is. The p func-
tions for initial situations are provided with a normalization condition that the sum of
probabilities of all initial situations is 1. This is expressed as follows:
Axiom 1 (Initial State Axiom)
∑
s:Init(s) p(s) = 1.
Probabilities of successor situations are defined as follows.
If a is an epistemic action and SF(a, sn) = (t, 1 − t), or SF(X, a, sn) = t and
SF(¬X, a, sn) = 1 − t, then in general it induces two successive situations for sn,
i.e., sn+1 = sn/X and s′n+1 = sn/¬X with probability p(sn)t and p(sn)(1 − t)
respectively. Note that if t = 0 or t = 1, it in fact only induces one successive situation
(situations with probability 0 will be ignored).
However, it is not always reasonable to simply change the current situation to the
successive situations as stated above. In some scenarios, we must keep the probabil-
ities of the beliefs induced by the current situations. For instance, assume that at Sk,
a passenger is classified as a male with probability 0.8, and at Sk+1, this passenger is
classified as a male with probability 0.6, then do we need to change the probability to
0.6? The answer is no. In real-world applications such as intelligent surveillance, we
observe that if a video analytic algorithm is used to continuously check the gender of a
person based on a video, then the probability of that person being a male will fluctuate.
Hence in practice, if at some time point, it is classified as a male with probability 0.9,
and later with probability 0.85, we can just keep the probability 0.9. A more persuasive
scenario is that at some time point we have external information (e.g., an analyst views
the person on a monitor) which indicates that the passenger is 100% a male, but later
the algorithm still classifies it as a male with probability 0.85, then it is obvious that we
do not need to change the probability from 1 to 0.85.
An exception to the above statement, is that the change of probability leads to a
change of beliefs. For example, if at Sk, a passenger is classified as male with probabil-
ity 0.8 (hence Belk(M) holds), but at Sk+1, it is classified as female with probability
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0.75 (hence Belk+1(¬M) holds), then this major change should not be ignored. It may
indicate that an interesting event has happened. In real systems, such belief changes
with respect to an invariable property, may, by themselves, justify alerting an analyst.
In short, the probabilities of the current belief are only changed when the sensing
result overwhelms the current belief. Here by overwhelm we mean either the belief in-
duced by the sensing result is the same as the current belief but with a greater probability
or the belief becomes different.
More precisely, let a be an epistemic action and SF(a, sn) = (t, 1−t). Without loss
of generality, we assume that t > 0.51 and hence Beln+1(X) holds. For each situation
sn ∈ Sn, it induces two successive situations, i.e., sn+1 = sn/X and s′n+1 = sn/¬X .
The probabilities of these two situations are defined as follows:
– if Beln(¬X) holds, then sn+1 = sn/X and s′n+1 = sn/¬X are assigned with
probability p(sn)t and p(sn)(1− t) respectively,
– if Beln(X) holds, then sn+1 = sn/X and s′n+1 = sn/¬X are assigned with
probability p(sn)max(pn(X), t) and p(sn)(1−max(pn(X), t)) respectively.
For this we have the following result which shows that the assignment of probabilities
satisfy the statements we argued before.
Proposition 1 For any epistemic propertyX and n > 0, if bothBeln(X) andBeln+1(X)
hold, then pn+1(X) = max(pn(X), SF(X, a, sn)). If bothBeln(¬X) andBeln+1(X)
hold, then pn+1(X) = SF(X, a, sn).
There might be some equivalent situations in Sn+1 (in terms of all fluents). For conve-
nience, they can be merged together.
Example 2 Assume that a video analyzer detects a passenger on board but it does not
know whether the passenger is male or female. So it considers two possible situations
S10 and S
2
0 at the beginning where
S10 = Male ∧ Stand, S20 = Female ∧ Stand
The video analytic algorithm gives S10 with probability 0.8 and S
2
0 with probability 0.2.
The bottom-half of Fig. 1 illustrates these two situations.
After some seconds, the camera does a second detection from which the video ana-
lytic algorithm asserts that the passenger is male with probability 0.9 and female with
probability 0.1. In Fig. 1, Sensing Gender is abbreviated as SG. Hence each situation
induces two successive situations (in Fig. 1, 0.18=0.2*0.9, etc.) and then equivalent
situations are merged together, which finally forms two situations S11 and S
2
1 in Fig. 1.
It seems that we can let each initial situation in Fig. 1 only induce one successive
situation and simply change the probabilities of the successive situations to 0.9 and 0.1,
respectively. The reason why we do not follow this way is that the latter approach is not
applicable on some occasions. For instance, if there is only one initial situation S10 , then
from the second detection, probability 0.1 should be assigned to a successive situation
that the passenger is a female but no initial situations can induce such a successive
situation.
1 In practice, we can always change (0.5, 0.5) to (0.5+ ², 0.5− ²) for a small positive real ². It
does not make much difference.
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Fig. 1. Situations after Sensing the Gender of a Passenger
If a is an ontic action and NSF(a, s) = (t, 1 − t), then for each situation sn ∈ Sn,
it induces two successive situations sn+1 = sn/X and s′n+1 = sn/Y with proba-
bility p(sn)t and p(sn)(1 − t) respectively. Similarly, if there are equivalent induced
situations, then we can merge them.
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 For any ontic property X and n > 0, pn+1(X) = NSF(X, a, sn).
Example 3 Assume we have two possible initial situations S10 and S20 at the beginning
where
S10 = Male ∧ Stand, S20 = Male ∧ ¬Stand
The video analytic algorithm gives S10 with probability 0.8 and S
2
0 with probability 0.2.
The bottom-half of Fig. 2 illustrates these two situations (Note that this figure is similar
to Fig. 1 except that the action is an ontic action).
After some seconds, the camera does a second detection from which the video an-
alytic algorithm asserts that the passenger takes a seat with probability 0.9 and it is
standing with probability 0.1. In Fig. 2, Sensing Position is abbreviated as SP. Using
the above method, finally we get two situations S11 and S
2
1 in Fig. 2.
For any epistemic or ontic actions, the revised probabilities always sum up to 1.
Proposition 3 For any n > 0,
∑
s∈Sn p(s) = 1.
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Fig. 2. Situations after Sensing the Position of a Passenger
4 Belief Revision
Belief revision studies how an agent’s beliefs can be changed based on some new in-
formation if the new information must be believed. Any property of interest (no matter
epistemic properties or ontic properties) could be revised when obtaining certain new
information on that property of the observable. Studying belief revision in situation
calculus is a natural course for managing an agent’s beliefs. In the following, we as-
sume that for each formula φ to be revised, there is a corresponding action that obtains
information on that property.
Definition 2 (Uniform formula, adapted from [24, 11]) A formula is uniform if it con-
tains no unbound variables.
Definition 3 A uniform formula φ is called obtainable from an action A with regard to
a situation s, denoted: (A, s)→ φ, if{
SF (φ,A, s) > SF (¬φ,A, s), A is an epistemic action,
NSF (φ,A, s) > NSF (¬φ,A, s), otherwise.
A is called a revision action for φ w.r.t. Σ, if for any s, (A, s)→ φ.
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Note that here the meaning of revision is in fact extended to updating as it also handles
changes of ontic properties as ontic actions changes the environment2.
Now by abuse of notation, we useBel(φ, s) to denoteBeln(φ)where s is a situation
in the n-th run.
Theorem 1 Let φ be a domain-dependent, uniform formula, and A be a revision action
for φ w.r.t. Σ, then we have:
Σ |= [∀s, φ[s]→ Bel(φ, do(A, s))] ∧ [∀s,¬φ[s]→ Bel(¬φ, do(A, s))].
This theorem proves that revision (as well as updating) in our framework is handled
adequately. That is, if new information indicates that φ holds, then the agent will believe
that φ holds after performing A. Conversely, if new information shows that φ does not
hold, then the agent will believe ¬φ after performing A. This theorem is also consistent
with the framework in [20, 21, 24, 11].
Theorem 2 Let A be a revision action for domain-dependent, uniform formula φ w.r.t.
Σ, then the following sentence is satisfiable:
Σ ∪ {Bel(¬φ, S0), Bel(φ, do(A,S0)),¬Bel(FALSE, do(A,S0))}.
This theorem shows that even if the agent believes ¬φ in S0, it will believe φ after per-
forming A when action A provides that φ is true, and still maintains consistent beliefs
(¬Bel(FALSE, do(A,S0))).
5 Example
The advantage of the methods proposed in this paper is that it can tolerate the existence
of errors and correct errors, hence keeps a well established track of video analytics.
Error correction can be done by either internal inspections or external inferences. In
this section, we use a surveillance example to illustrate this advantage.
Example 4 Now we are going to model a simplified scenario that a passenger boards
a bus. We use Fig. 3 to illustrate the situation pedigree. Multiple passengers can be
modeled by multiple situation pedigrees.
Similar to the previous examples, we use SP to denote Sensing Position and SG to
denote Sensing Gender. In addition to the internal actions SP and SG, we also allow
external instructions as external actions into the system, e.g., P (M) = 1 (resp. P (F ) =
1) in Fig. 3 which means that the external instructions suggesting the passenger is
definitely a male (resp. a female).
Now we give the explanations of the process depicted by Figure 3.
The two initial situations are:
S10 = Male ∧ Stand, S20 = Female ∧ Stand
That is, initially the video analytics tell us that the passenger is standing but it does not
know accurately whether it is male or female, only providing probability values 0.8 for
male and 0.2 for female.
2 Revision receives (and accepts) information about a static world while updating means that the
world itself has been changed [8].
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Fig. 3. Surveillance Example
11
After a while, the sensor re-examines the position of the passenger (SP in the bottom
of Fig. 3) and tells us it is now standing with probability 0.9 and seated with probability
0.1. Hence our method gives four possible successive situations S11 , S
2
1 , S
3
1 , and S
4
1 as
shown in Fig. 3.
Now the monitor in the control room provides a piece of information that this pas-
senger is definitely a male (p(M) = 1 in Fig. 3). Hence we get two successive situations
S12 and S
2
2 . We can see that the possibility of the passenger being a female is eliminated.
Then the sensor re-examines the gender of the passenger (SG in the middle of Fig.
3), and tells us it is a male with probability 0.85 and female with probability 0.15. How-
ever, since it does not change the belief that this person is a male and the probability
of this person being a male (0.85) is less than the one in the current situation (where
the probability of the person being a male is 1), according to our procedure, we do
not need to change the probability, hence the two successive situations S13 and S
2
3 are
just the same to their predecessors. Note that here new information from SG shows the
passenger is male, and after performing SG, the proposition the passenger is male is
believed. It verifies Theorem 1.
After that the sensor checks the position of the passenger (SP in the top half of
Fig. 3). This time the passenger might have taken a seat, hence the video analytics
tell us that the passenger is standing with probability 0.3 and seated (¬Stand) with
probability 0.7. Then two successive situations are induced as S14 and S
2
4 in Fig. 3.
Finally, the passenger accidentally removes some of her disguise and the video
analytics tell us that it is a female with probability 0.65 and a male with probability
0.35. Then we obtain four successive situations S15 , S
2
5 , S
3
5 and S
4
5 . Since there is a big
change in epistemic properties (Male → Female), an alert is triggered and reported
to the control room. Also note that here Theorem 1 is verified.
This example clearly shows how the beliefs are smoothly maintained or changed
with uncertain internal (video analytics) and external information, whilst video analyt-
ics just tell what is what at each time point, without continuity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a framework to deal with uncertain observations. This
framework is based on a revised version of situation calculus. It allows external instruc-
tions as well as internal actions. It is able to tackle with uncertain epistemic actions and
uncertain ontic actions. Early errors can be corrected in this framework by revision and
updating.
In the literature, probabilistic methods (e.g. dynamic bayesian networks, [26], etc.)
and other AI techniques (e.g. Bilattice reasoning, [25], etc.) have been applied in com-
puter vision/video surveillance. Comparing to these approaches, our framework con-
siders and easily handles external information. In addition, the ability of belief revision
and updating makes it easy to correct past mistakes.
For future work, we are implementing this framework as a part of an on-going intel-
ligent surveillance project (CSIT) to enhance the power of event reasoning, especially
for error correction. The full implementation includes a thorough set of ontic actions,
epistemic actions for a set of properties of interest. It also can be naturally extended to
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allow for multiple agents (passengers). In addition, the situations can serve as a foun-
dation for event inference proposed in [12]. Another interesting issue is to study the
properties that the framework satisfy.
Acknowledgement
This research work is sponsored by the EPSRC projects EP/G034303/1 and EP/H049606/1
(the CSIT project).
References
1. F. Bacchus, J. Halpern, and H. Levesque. Reasoning about noisy sensors and effectors in the
situation calculus. Artificial Intelligence, 111(1-2):171–208, 1998.
2. Bsia. Florida school bus surveillance. In http://www.bsia.co.uk/LY8VIM18989 action;displays
tudy sectorid;LYCQYL79312 caseid;NFLEN064798.
3. G. De Giacomo and H. Levesque. Progression using regression and sensors. In Procs. of
IJCAI, pages 160–165, 1999.
4. A. Herzig, J. Lang, and P. Marquis. Action representation and partially observable planning
using epistemic logic. In Procs. of IJCAI, pages 1067–1072, 2003.
5. G. Lakemeyer and H. Levesque. A semantic characterization of a useful fragment of the
situation calculus with knowledge. Artificial Intelligence, 175(1):142–164, 2011.
6. H. Levesque. What is planning in the presence of sensing? In Procs. of AAAI, pages 1139–
1146, 1996.
7. W. Liu, P. Miller, J. Ma, and W. Yan. Challenges of distributed intelligent surveillance system
with heterogenous information. In Procs. of QRASA, pages 69–74, Pasadena, California,
2009.
8. J. Ma, W. Liu, and S. Benferhat. A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states
with partial epistemic states. In Procs. of AAAI, pages 333–338, 2010.
9. J. Ma, W. Liu, and A. Hunter. Inducing probability distributions from knowledge bases with
(in)dependence relations. In Procs. of AAAI, pages 339–344, 2010.
10. J. Ma, W. Liu, and P. Miller. Event modelling and reasoning with uncertain information for
distributed sensor networks. In Procs. of SUM, pages 236–249. Springer, 2010.
11. J. Ma, W. Liu, and P. Miller. Belief change with noisy sensing in the situation calculus. In
Procs. of UAI, 2011.
12. J. Ma, W. Liu, P. Miller, and W. Yan. Event composition with imperfect information for bus
surveillance. In Procs. of AVSS, pages 382–387. IEEE Press, 2009.
13. J. McCarthy. Situations, Actions and Causal Laws. Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1963.
14. J. McCarthy and P. Hayes. Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial
intelligence. In Machine Intelligence, volume 4, pages 463–502. Edinburgh University Press,
1969.
15. P. Miller, W. Liu, F. Fowler, H. Zhou, J. Shen, J. Ma, J. Zhang, W. Yan, K. McLaughlin, and
S. Sezer. Intelligent sensor information system for public transport: To safely go .... In Procs.
of AVSS, 2010.
16. ECIT Queen’s University of Belfast. Airport corridor surveillance.
http://www.csit.qub.ac.uk/Research/ResearchGroups/IntelligentSurveillanceSystems, 2010.
17. US Defense of the Homeland. Washington rail corridor surveillance.
http://preview.govtsecurity.com/news/Washington-rail-corridor-surveillance/, 2006.
13
18. US Department of Transportation. Rita - its research program.
http://www.its.dot.gov/ITS ROOT2010/its program/ ITSfederal program.htm, 2010.
19. R. Reiter. The frame problem in the situation calculus: A simple solution (sometimes) and a
completeness result for goal regression. In Aritificial Intelligence and Mathematical Theory
of Computation: Papers in Honor of John McCarthy, pages 359–380. Academic Press, 1991.
20. R. Scherl and H. Levesque. The frame problem and knowledge-producing actions. In Procs.
of AAAI, pages 689–695, 1993.
21. R. Scherl and H. Levesque. Knowledge, action, and the frame problem. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 144(1-2):1–39, 2003.
22. Gardiner Security. Glasgow transforms bus security with ip video surveillance. In
http://www.ipusergroup.com/doc-upload/Gardiner-Glasgowbuses.pdf.
23. S. Shapiro. Belief change with noisy sensing and introspection. In Procs. of NRAC, pages
84–89, 2005.
24. S. Shapiro, M. Pagnucco, Y. Lespe´rance, and H. Levesque. Iterated belief change in the
situation calculus. Artificial Intelligence, 175(1):165–192, 2011.
25. V. D. Shet, J. Neumann, V. Ramesh, and L. S. Davis. Bilattice-based logical reasoning for
human detection. In IEEE Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR’07,
pages 1–8, 2007.
26. T. Wang, Q. Diao, Y. Zhang, G. Song, C. Lai, and G. Bradski. A dynamic bayesian network
approach to multi-cue based visual tracking. In Procs. of Pattern Recognition, ICPR, pages
167–170, 2004.
14
